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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
ROBERT J. BERNERT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20030329CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony (R. 75-76). 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss, based on double jeopardy, where the court never entered 
a final judgment of conviction on an earlier charge arising out 
of the same criminal act, to which defendant pled guilty? 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
dismiss presents a question of law, reviewed under a correctness 
standard. State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, 510, 17 P.3d 1145. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute or rule is dispositive 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with one count of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, to which 
he tendered a plea of guilty (R. 2; Tr. of 4/22/02 at 1-4). Upon 
request by the city prosecutor, the court refused to accept the 
plea and granted the city's motion to dismiss (Tr. of 4/23/02 at 
1, 4-5). 
The State then charged defendant with one count of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony (R. 4-5). 
Defendant entered a not guilty plea and moved to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds (R. 11, 33-38). After a hearing on the 
matter, the court denied the motion (R. 54-55, 56, 59-60). 
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, which the 
trial court accepted (R. 67-72; R. 1-6). The court subsequently 
sentenced defendant to zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 75-76). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
78) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In April of 2002, Ogden City charged defendant with the 
class B misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (R. 1). At the arraignment hearing, defendant's 
counsel informed the court that defendant intended to plead 
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guilty (Tr. of 4/22/02 at 2). Following a plea colloquy, the 
following interchange occurred: 
The Court: Alright, the Court will make a 
finding that this plea has 
been knowingly and voluntarily 
entered into to the charge of 
DUI. How do you plead? 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Prosecutor: 
The Court: 
Def. Counsel 
The Court: 
Prosecutor: 
I pled [sic] guilty, Your 
Honor. 
Is there a breath or blood 
test? 
Your Honor, there may be, but 
I don't have it. 
Recommendation, counsel? 
Is (inaudible) a blood test? 
No, he didn't have the results 
yet. 
Your Honor, this is not his 
first offense. He did have an 
alcohol related reckless prior 
to this. 
The Court: Let's talk about that. . . . 
(Id. at 4) . The court then reviewed defendant's record, which 
reflected eight other alcohol-related crimes. Reflecting on 
defendant's "extensive record," the trial court commented, "So 
I'm kind of surprised that this isn't a Class A or a felony" 
(IcL) • 
At this juncture, as defense counsel began arguing for his 
client's counseling needs, the city prosecutor interrupted: "Your 
honor, at this point I.would move the Court not to accept his 
guilty plea and I'll transfer [the case] to the county [for 
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prosecution as a felony]" (Id. at 5). The court continued the 
matter for a day, commenting, "We'll see if the city is going to 
stay with the charges or if they're going to file it as a felony. 
He's already entered his plea. I don't know if the city can do 
that but I'm going to continue it over one day and think about 
it" (Id^). 
The following day, the city prosecutor explained to a 
different judge, "What I asked yesterday is that the Court refuse 
to accept [defendant's] plea which is, it's my understanding[,] 
is not a problem and that then the city is dismissing this as 
long as the county has filed" (Tr. of 4/23/02 at 1). The court 
granted the request without comment (Id.). 
The State filed a single felony charge against defendant, 
and defendant responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
the felony prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because he 
had already entered a guilty plea to the same crime previously 
charged as a misdemeanor (R. 33-38). The motion was heard by a 
third judge, who opined: 
[F]rom an objective standpoint, I'm prepared 
to say today that [the original judge] did 
not [accept the guilty plea] because he 
didn't say that he did. He didn't proceed to 
impose sentence. He asked for some 
preliminary information. . . . In other 
words, just because somebody says I plead 
guilty doesn't necessarily mean that the 
Court is obliged to accept that plea. It 
ought to accept the plea when it's fully 
appraised of the case and it's appropriate to 
accept the plea. 
-a-
(R. 83: 5-6). Notwithstanding this determination, the court sent 
the case back to the original judge to determine "whether he, in 
his mind[,] accepted the plea" (Id.). 
The original judge listened to the tape of the disputed 
proceeding and to the arguments of the parties. He then ruled 
that he had not accepted the plea: 
I'll be candid. [Defendant] entered his plea. 
I was surprised that he entered his plea in 
the first place because I was looking at his 
record at the time that they handed up his 
OR. We had discussed the issue of whether or 
not he was going to be released or not and I 
had his OR and when I asked for the breath 
test and then I asked for his record, at that 
point the city spoke up . . . saying that he 
did not want me to accept the plea and then 
there's some shuffling as he checks with the 
record. My honest opinion is I took the plea 
but I never accepted it, I never intended to 
go ahead and sentence on the particular 
issues. 
(R. 83: tab 1 at 3); see also R. 54-55 at addendum A (findings of 
fact). 
With this subjective confirmation of his previously-
articulated objective point of view, the third judge denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 59-60 at addendum B). The 
court reasoned that because defendant's tendered guilty plea to 
the misdemeanor charge had not been accepted, double jeopardy did 
not attach to that prosecution. Consequently, the State was free 
to file the charge anew as a felony without violating the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. 
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Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
felony DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of 
his motion to dismiss (R. 67-72) . The court sentenced him to 
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison, and he filed this 
timely appeal (R. 75-76, 78). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS 
BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT ENTER A 
FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN THE 
MISDEMEANOR CASE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, 
JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH 
The gist of defendant's argument is that when he uttered the 
words "I plead guilty" to the misdemeanor charge of DUI, the plea 
was "entered," and double jeopardy attached.1 Consequently, when 
the court later granted the city's request to dismiss the charge, 
the State was constitutionally precluded from refiling it as a 
felony. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-13. This argument fails as a 
matter of law.2 
This Court has recognized the principle that "[jjeopardy 
attaches when a plea is accepted by a trial court." State v. 
Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, 525, 17 P.3d 1145; accord State v. Kay, 
1
 Defendant also argues that the trial court's request for 
a sentencing recommendation evidences his implicit acceptance of 
the guilty plea. See Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. 
2
 Defendant also asserts that the withdrawal of the plea 
cannot be justified under the theory of a misplea. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 15-19. The trial court did not render its ruling on 
this basis, nor need this Court reach it as an alternative ground 
for affirmance. 
-o-
717 P.2d 1294, 1303 (Utah 1986). More recently, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the statutory term, "entry of the plea," 
refers to the date of entry of final judgment of conviction. 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 111, 31 P.3d 528 (holding that 30-
day limit on withdrawal of guilty plea runs from date of entry of 
final judgment of conviction, which constitutes final disposition 
of case in district court); see also State v. McGee, 2001 UT 69, 
18, 31 P.3d 531 (interpreting Utah Code Ann. §" 77-13-6(2) (b), 
governing plea withdrawals and stating that "[i]n the context of 
criminal cases, '[the] sentence . . . is [the] final judgment,' 
State v. Soper, 559 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1977), and is the event 
that triggers the 'entry' of the plea within the meaning of the 
statute"). Under these cases, then, a guilty plea is not 
accepted until the court enters judgment and sentences the 
defendant. 
Explaining the rationale for this rule of law, the supreme 
court has noted that "it makes no sense to deprive the district 
court of the power to review a plea before it enters a judgment 
of conviction and sentence." Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 110. In the 
interests of justice, pleas must be "subject to review up until 
the time of sentencing." State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 539, 44 
P.3d 756. Such flexibility permits the trial court, in the 
interests of justice, to assess the plea in light of whatever 
information about defendant is or becomes available. Such 
information "may occasionally produce information affecting the 
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validity of the plea or the actual guilt of the defendant." 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 510. 
Thus, since jeopardy does not attach until the plea is 
accepted, Horrocks, and the plea is not accepted until judgment 
is entered, Ostler, jeopardy does not attach until judgment is 
entered. 
In this case, after defendant tendered his plea but before 
the court accepted it by entering judgment, the court reviewed 
defendant's history and realized that defendant had an extensive 
history of similar crimes. See Tr. of 4/22/03 at 4. Having not 
yet entered judgment, the court retained the right to reject the 
plea and dismiss the case so that the prosecutor could more 
appropriately file it as a felony. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 1110. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count: of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jj_ day of January, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
SANDRA L. CORP 4411 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, v, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. BERNERT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON ISSUE 
OF PRIOR PLEA PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE JUDGE W. BRENT 
WEST 
CaseNo.021901715 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
[W. BRENT WEST] 
This case was referred to this Court for clarification of an issue of fact regarding a prior 
plea proceeding in a dismissed Ogden City case involving the same offense. The parties agreed 
that this Court should clarify whether it had accepted a plea of guilty to the offense in case 
number 025904348 on April 22, 2002. This Court reviewed the audio tape of the April 22 
hearing and issued its oral findings on October 23, 2002. Counsel for both parties were present. 
This Court now enters the following: 
1. Ogden City charged defendant with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B 
misdemeanor, based upon citation # D449693 dated April 20, 2002. 
2. Defendant appeared before this Court at video arraignments to answer the charge on 
April 22, 2002 in case number 025904348. 
3. Defendant stated that he pleaded guilty to the charge at that time. 
051 
4. This Court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, found that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary, and then inquired about Defendant's prior record but did not indicate acceptance of 
the plea. 
5. Prior to a sentence being imposed, the City moved to dismiss the case so that it could 
be filed by the Weber County Attorney's Office as a third degree felony based upon Defendant's 
prior record. 
6. This Court stayed the proceedings and continued the matter one day to allow the City 
to further argue its motion to dismiss. 
7. This Court did not accept Defendant's guilty plea on April 22, 2002. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 2002. 
BY THE COUI 
mi L U U I U : /-\ 
W. BRENT WEST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings was mailed to: Kent E. Snider, 
Attorney for Defendant, 289 24,h Street, Ogden, UT 84401 this Z*T day of October, 2002. 
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SANDRA L. CORP 4411 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 M Mr->i 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 a * ' P 12- 19 
1
 iMTtMU COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. BERNERT, 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ON ISSUE OF PRIOR 
PLEA PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE JUDGE W. BRENT 
WEST 
CaseNo.021901715 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
This case was referred to Judge West for clarification of an issue of fact regarding a prior 
plea proceeding in a dismissed Ogden City case involving the same offense. Judge West entered 
Findings of Fact establishing that Defendant's plea was not accepted in the prior 
prosecution. Based upon the Findings of Fact entered by Judge West, this Court now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jeopardy did not attach in the prior case when Defendant merely tendered a plea that 
was not accepted by Judge West. 
2. Because jeopardy did not attach in the prior prosecution prior to it being dismissed, the 
State was free to refile the charge as a third degree felony in this case. 
Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law, the Court now enters the following: 
05Q 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy is denied. 
DATED this I] day of December, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
tokii (J. L*-
MICHAEL D. LYOl 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings was mailed to: Kent E. Snider, 
Attorney for Defendant, 289 24th Street, Ogden, UT 84401 this 2-- day of December, 2002. 
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